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‘Policy Coherence for Development’ (PCD) seeks to ensure that non-aid public 
policies are consistent with a government’s international development goals. In the 
light of a number of years of PCD reviews and institutional reforms at both EU and 
member state level, this paper reflects on the dynamics of the PCD policy 
environment and discusses five challenges for the PCD policy agenda. These include 
the opposing interests of domestic and development constituencies, conflicts between 
development objectives themselves, disagreements between experts on what ‘good’ 
development policy is, difficulties in identifying the true development interest of 
developing countries, and the growing heterogeneity between and within developing 
countries. While the challenges discussed in this paper have general relevance, we 
draw on EU and Irish policies to illustrate the arguments. We conclude with a series 
of recommendations on how these challenges might be addressed and how to make 
the PCD agenda more effective. 
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1.  Introduction 
Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is achieved when policies across a range of 
domestic policy areas support, or at the very least do not undermine, the attainment of 
overseas development objectives. PCD seeks to represent the interests of the poorest 
developing countries within developed country policymaking processes and seeks to 
ensure that investments in overseas aid are not undermined by damaging non-aid 
policies.  
 
Issues of policy incoherence are most obviously seen in agricultural, trade and 
environmental policies but also in policy areas such as finance, science and 
technology, security and migration policy. While some progress towards coherence 
has occurred in recent years as the EU and Member States have begun to 
systematically consider PCD, the agenda is in its infancy and many issues of 
incoherence have yet to be resolved.  In any case, as policies, issues, and political 
preferences change over time, policy coherence becomes a moving target, requiring 
continuous efforts to ensure developing countries are not negatively affected by 
developed country non-aid policies. PCD should therefore be considered a continuous 
process of evaluation and reflection which seeks to ensure ever-increasing policy 
coherence towards developing countries in developed country policies.  
 
The recent fiscal crisis in OECD countries has focused attention on the potential of 
PCD to deliver real improvements in the livelihoods of the poor in developing 
countries. In the context of declining aid budgets, PCD represents a cost effective way 
for OECD members to support real progress towards the Millennium Development 
Goals.    3
 
This paper reflects on the dynamics of the PCD policy environment and identifies five 
important challenges that the PCD policy agenda must address. It is hoped that the 
discussion will provide researchers, policymakers and practitioners with a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics that underlie the PCD process. We examine the 
opposing interests of domestic and development constituencies and ways in which 
these could be aligned, the significance of conflicts between development objectives 
themselves, disagreements between experts on what ‘good’ development policy is, 
difficulties in identifying the true development interest of developing countries, and 
the growing heterogeneity between and within developing countries. We argue that 
international institutions and agreements can be important in helping to overcome 
apparent policy conflicts. We note the importance for PCD of recognising the role of 
special interest groups in formulating domestic policy both in developed and 
developing countries. We also emphasise the importance of good research in 
providing the evidence base for more coherent policy decision-making. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a brief history of the PCD 
concept and its implementation in the EU and Irish context. The following sections 
discuss five challenges that arise in attempting to pursue more coherent policies for 
development. In the final section we conclude with some recommendations to 
strengthen the PCD process under three headings; more effective decision-making 
mechanisms, stronger and more comprehensive formal oversight procedures and the 
promotion of a robust evidence base for policy impact and coherence.  
 
   4
2.  The PCD Agenda: A Brief History 
At EU level, PCD first came to prominence with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The 
Treaty states that ‘the Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in 
Article 130U [which refers to development cooperation] in the policies that it 
implements which are likely to affect developing countries’.
2 This statement signalled 
the rise to prominence of the PCD agenda at the EU level (Carbone, 2008).  As part of 
the European Consensus on Development, the EU in 2005 committed to a biennial 
PCD reporting process. The first reports on progress towards PCD commitments were 
issued in 2007 (European Commission, 2007) and 2009 (European Commission, 
2009). 
 
The annual OECD ministerial meeting in 2002 called on OECD members to “enhance 
understanding of the development dimensions of member country policies and their 
impacts on developing countries”. The OECD specifically proposed that policy 
development should consider “trade-offs and potential synergies across such areas as 
trade, investment, agriculture, health, education, the environment and development 
co-operation, to encourage greater policy coherence in support of the internationally 
agreed development goals”. Since then, the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee has included an analysis of PCD efforts in its regular reviews of member 
country aid policies. The findings of recent reviews are synthesised in OECD (2009).
  
 
PCD also forms an integral part of the UN Millennium Development Goals 
framework. The 8th goal – to ‘develop a global partnership for development’ – covers 
                                                      
2 This objective is now found in Article 208 in the Treaty of Lisbon on the Functioning of the European 
Union.   5
actions needed to achieve greater coherence between the purposes of Official 
Development Assistance and other public policies.  
 
Responding to PCD developments at the EU level, the Government of Ireland White 
Paper on Irish Aid (2006) adopted coherence as a guiding principle for Ireland’s 
overseas development aid programme. The Paper stated that “we will work for a 
coherent approach to development across all Government Departments”. To 
implement the vision of the White Paper, the government established the Inter-
Departmental Committee on Development (IDCD) in 2007 to act as a forum to 
promote PCD in all areas of Irish Government policy that affect developing countries. 
The scope of the policy coherence for development agenda in Ireland is reviewed in 
Barry at al. (2009).   
 
Across Europe, member states have pursued the PCD agenda in different ways 
(ECDPM, 2005, 2007, 2008; EU Commission, 2007, 2009; OECD 2009 and 
Egenhofer, 2008). In the Netherlands, foreign policy has the explicit aim of promoting 
policy coherence between development and relevant non-aid policies and to support 
this, the Dutch established a formal Policy Coherence Unit in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to screen all EU legislation, to pro-actively influence specific national policy 
debates and to raise awareness of PCD both domestically and internationally.  In 
contrast, the United Kingdom and Sweden have taken the whole of government 
approach to overseas development. The United Kingdom does not use the label 
‘policy coherence’ but set poverty eradication as an objective for the whole of the 
government in its 2000 White Paper on ‘International Development Eliminating 
World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor’ (HMSO, 2000). As a result,   6
PCD discussion occurs across all UK ministries and each ministry is responsible for 
reporting progress towards the MDGs. In Sweden, the Government Bill ‘Shared 
Responsibility: Sweden's Policy for Global Development’ was passed by the Swedish 
Parliament in 2003, enshrining development goals as the responsibility of all 
government departments (Government of Sweden, 2003).  
 
Despite the endorsement of PCD at the highest political levels, the practical 
implementation of PCD remains a fraught process. EU development NGOs have 
given a critical reception to the second Commission PCD report, highlighting the 
many areas of continued incoherence in EU policies (CONCORD, 2009). Carbone 
(2008) has described the pursuit of policy coherence in EU policy-making as ‘mission 
impossible’. We now turn to discussing five challenges inherent in the PCD agenda 
which help to explain this paradox. 
 
3.  Challenges for the PCD Agenda 
3.1 Conflicting Domestic and International Development Goals 
The most obvious challenge faced by PCD occurs when domestic interests and 
international development objectives conflict. This is the single most important reason 
for the prevalence of incoherent policies. Adapting a domestic policy to take account 
of developing country interests may run counter to the interests of those whom the 
domestic policy is intended to promote or support. However, using examples from 
agricultural policy, migration policy and climate change, we argue that apparently 
conflicting interests may be more closely aligned if a sufficiently long-term 
perspective is taken. Specifically, international institutions and agreements can play   7
an important role to improve global policy outcomes by promoting cooperative 
policies that facilitate the pursuit of mutual long term benefits.   
 
Agricultural protectionism has for many decades been pursued by developed countries 
in support of domestic objectives such as the maintenance of farm incomes, support to 
rural communities, stabilisation of market prices and ensuring food security. These 
policies have led to significant negative externalities for developing countries. In the 
case of European agricultural policy, developing countries argue that the CAP 
damages their development efforts by depressing the world market price for their 
exports, making it more difficult for them to trade their way out of poverty. While 
recent reforms have opened European markets to exporters in the poorest developing 
countries, significantly reduced the dumping of agricultural surpluses and de-coupled 
subsidies from production, policy incoherence between developed and developing 
countries in the area of agricultural policy remains (Matthews, 2008).  
 
The EU continues to maintain high tariffs for many agricultural products. Direct 
payments to EU farmers contribute to covering their sunk costs allowing them a 
competitive advantage on world markets.
 3 Policies to stabilise EU farm prices have 
the effect of exporting instability to world markets, hence exacerbating price volatility 
for developing country producers. In addition, food standards, animal health and 
traceability rules provide safeguards to European consumers about the quality of food 
imports but can become barriers to trade by increasing exporting costs for developing 
country producers.  
 
                                                      
3 The argument that developing country consumers can benefit from the subsidisation of European 
agriculture through lower prices is discussed later in the paper.    8
In the area of environmental policy, and specifically the control of greenhouse gas 
emissions, the existence of conflicting policy interests was clearly revealed at the 
2009 Copenhagen Climate Change conference. The asymmetric distribution of the 
costs of adapting to climate change and the proposed allocation of mitigation costs 
lies at the centre of the policy conflict.  On the one hand, climate change is expected 
to have a disproportionate impact on poor developing countries, many of whom are 
characterised by low-lying lands and increasing desertification. The high cost of 
adaptation faced by developing countries is compounded by limited fiscal resources 
and competing demands on revenue from pressing social needs. On the other hand, 
developed countries are asked to shoulder the upfront costs of mitigation and 
contribute to the cost of global adaptation given their responsibility for the bulk of the 
stock of anthropogenic carbon emissions in the atmosphere to date. Issues of policy 
conflict become more acute when emerging economies assert their rights to high-
carbon, low-cost development paths.  
 
A further example of conflicting goals is developed countries’ encouragement of the 
immigration of skilled workers, such as expensively-educated health workers, from 
developing countries (OECD, 2009). Working visas, green cards and active 
recruitment policies are used by many developed countries to supplement their 
domestic labour supply. Depending on the sector and the level of state investment in 
the highly skilled migrant’s education, brain drain can lead to some degree of 
investment leakage and skills shortages in sending countries.  
 
These issues demonstrate apparently clear conflicts of interest between developed and 
developing countries. However, these interests can be reconciled if a longer term view   9
is taken. Underlying this time distinction is the premise that all nations will mutually 
benefit from higher incomes, higher levels of international trade and increased 
security associated with sustainable and more equitable development paths. Whether 
we consider economic growth or security policy, the elimination of poverty and 
emergence of higher incomes is in the long-term interest of developed countries.  
 
In the case of agricultural protectionism or failure to address climate change, the 
detrimental impacts on developing countries could give rise to political instability and 
extremism and are likely to trigger increased illegal immigration to developed 
countries. It will also reduce developing countries’ long-run capacity to absorb 
developed country exports. These long-term strategic considerations provided the 
rationale for apparently altruistic aid programmes such as the US Marshall Plan for 
post-war European reconstruction and the Structural Funds programmes of the 
European Union. 
 
The attraction of developing country health workers can also have a positive impact 
on the long-run well-being of developing countries. Remittances might compensate 
developing countries for their loss of human capital. In addition, if migrant workers 
return home later in their careers they can provide developing countries with highly 
experienced professionals. Countries such as the Philippines explicitly educate excess 
nurses for such reasons, while India, and indeed Ireland, benefited substantially from 
the return of experienced software engineers when their respective booms began 
(Kapur and McHale, 2005). In other words, an argument for ‘altruistic’ trade policy 
and the ‘self-interested’ attraction of developing country skilled workers can be   10
defended on the grounds of mutual interest if a sufficiently long-term time horizon is 
considered. 
 
Climate change provides an even more powerful example. Fiscally constrained 
developed country governments reluctant to increase costs on local businesses at a 
time of weak economic growth are unlikely to have an incentive to sign up to an 
international agreement imposing ambitious mitigation targets. Benefits to developed 
countries from mitigation policies and indeed adaptation investments by developed 
countries in developing countries are likely to accrue over a 20 to 50 year time 
horizon, as increased poverty, migration pressures, political instability and conflict are 
avoided. When one considers the reluctance of European nations to sufficiently 
prepare for future pension system liabilities over a similar time horizon it is apparent 
that the discount rate applied to long-term costs and benefits is very high.
4  
 
One possible explanation for the tendency of policymakers to overlook benefits or 
costs that accrue over the long-term is the electoral cycle. Disincentives to taking the 
long-term view exist because politicians in democratic systems are constrained in 
their policymaking by the need to retain the support of the electorate and of a time-
varying combination of sectional interests and swing voters. Policymakers may 
therefore be unable to pursue the longer-term strategy of mutual interest in trade or 
environmental policy, opting instead to pursue short-term political survival. Other 
potential explanations include myopia of the electorate or powerful sectoral interests, 
a point we discuss later in the paper. 
 
                                                      
4 A high discount rate means that current costs and benefits are accorded much greater importance in 
policymakers’ minds than future costs and benefits.    11
The high discount rate of policymakers underlines the role that international 
institutions can play in providing a framework within which the longer-term global 
public good can be pursued. To illustrate how international institutions can support 
long-term coherent policy, we invoke the classic prisoner’s dilemma problem.
5   We 
focus on the case of two countries, each facing a choice between low trade tariffs if 
they cooperate and high trade tariffs if they do not.  If one country commits to low 
tariffs, the other may be better off by choosing high tariffs. But this means that neither 
will be prepared to commit on its own to low tariffs. Some form of binding 
international agreement is required to provide the basis for mutual commitment to low 




In climate change policy, the standard prisoner’s dilemma game described above must 
be altered. Benefits to low carbon emissions are not likely to be realisable in the short-
term (even though global marginal abatement cost curves such as those devised by 
McKinsey (2009) suggest substantial opportunities for lower emissions at negative 
costs, providing win-win scenarios for both the environment and economic welfare). 
In the short-term payoffs from cooperation are likely to be lower than the payoffs 
from non-cooperation (high carbon emissions). It is only when the game is repeated 
over the medium to long-term that the benefits to mutual low emission strategies 
become significant. This delayed payoff component, coupled with the uncertainties of 
                                                      
5 In the typical version of the prisoner’s dilemma problem, both countries receive a payoff of 2 for not 
cooperating, with a payoff of 3 on offer for each country if they cooperate. If one country chooses to 
cooperate and the other defects the payoffs are 1 and 4 respectively. Unless there are strong beliefs that 
the other country will choose to cooperate, the rational strategy for a country is to choose non-
cooperation.  
6 A political economy reading of the role of the WTO would recognise that it is an institution that 
can be used to provide national politicians with political cover if they wish to resist populist 
pressures towards detrimental protectionism.  The WTO trade agreements do indeed appear to 
have played such a role in the current global crisis, in contrast to the descent into global 
protectionism seen over the course of the Great Depression of the 1930s.    12
benefits and costs over this time period, have conspired to prevent the establishment 
of a comprehensive and enforceable international agreement to mitigate and adapt to 
the effects of climate change at the December 2009 Copenhagen Conference.  
 
We thus emphasise the importance of promoting international agreements to 
encourage reciprocity in cooperation and recognition of long-term benefits and costs 
as a vital policy instrument in the pursuit of policy coherence for development. Well-
designed international agreements and institutions offer a framework for protecting 
long-term benefits against the tendencies of policymakers to value short-term benefits 
more highly than longer-term gains.  
 
Further opportunities for the PCD agenda are opened up when we consider the 
possibility that national policies might not even be beneficial to national welfare. The 
idea is expressed succinctly by Garret FitzGerald (2000) who notes that “democratic 
national governments tend to be subject to such strong pressure from vested interests 
within their own territories that many of their decisions operate against the interests of 
society as a whole”. Such issues are explored in the burgeoning literature on “the 
political economy of protectionism”, which takes as its starting point Olson’s (1965) 
work on interest groups.  
 
Consider the Irish stance on agriculture in the ongoing Doha Round World Trade 
Organisation trade negotiations. Ireland has some small but significant weight in the 
determination of EU agricultural and food policies through the decision-making 
institutions of the European Union. Given the relative importance of the agri-food 
industry in Ireland and its significant dependence on EU agricultural support, Ireland   13
has historically been more reluctant than many other EU member states to embrace 
agricultural policy reform.
7  Collins (1993) and Adshead (1996) suggest that Irish 
agricultural policymaking within the European context displays the characteristics of 
a “closed policy community”, one which excludes other interests, particularly 
consumers, and yields a false appearance of national consensus.
8  Ireland, in the 
summer of 2008, prioritised protection of the agricultural sector in its approach to the 
WTO negotiations, even at the risk that this could have jeopardised an overall 
agreement.
9 Ireland’s export-oriented manufacturing and services sectors, by contrast, 
stood to gain substantially from an overall agreement (Hinds and O’Donoghue, 2008). 
Furthermore, it was estimated that the gains to the winning sectors would outweigh 
the losses to agriculture (Matthews and Walsh, 2006).  
 
The differing influence of competing interest groups on national policy opens the 
possibility of unconventional coalitions in support of coherent policies towards the 
developing world. PCD advocates may find themselves sharing common ground with 
particular local sectional interests. For example, both development agencies and 
environmental groups argued for CAP reform over the last decade. Development 
advocates concerned about the impact on developing countries of international tax 
fraud share common interests with those seeking to curb financing for international 
terrorism. As PCD issues evolve, the forging of partnerships with domestic interest 
groups who may also be adversely affected by incoherent policy measures from a 
                                                      
7 The early adoption by Ireland of full decoupling (where farm payments are no longer linked to 
production) and the recent cessation of Irish sugar production – which means the country no 
longer competes in a product where developing countries have a clear comparative advantage due 
to lower production costs – mean, however, that Irish policy has been shifting in a more PCD-
consistent direction. 
8Chubb (1992) quotes approvingly from Magill magazine that “Ministers for Agriculture have, 
since Ireland’s entry into the EEC, become Ministers for Farmers”!  
9 Irish Farmers Journal Newspaper, 07 June 2008 “Veto word takes IFA back from the Lisbon 
cliff”.   14
development perspective will become an increasingly important strategy for 
implementing PCD.  
 
3.2  Conflicting Development Goals    
Some development goals are themselves likely to be in conflict, so that trade-offs are 
required. Tensions arise, for example, between the goals of industrialisation and the 
reduction of carbon emissions, and between increased agricultural production and the 
protection of biodiversity. Another topical case is the conflict between environment-
friendly biofuels production as a source of export earnings and employment and the 
objective of food security. We discuss these cases in this section with a view to 
elucidating the significance of this issue for the PCD agenda. 
 
First, in the literature on the Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC) it has been argued 
that as a country becomes richer, environmental degradation initially increases. But as 
incomes rise further, the adoption of modern technology, the shift into services and a 
change in preferences may cause this to be reversed.
10 Whether or not this reversal 
occurs, developing countries are in many cases likely to be situated on the upward 
sloping part of the curve. Evidence of this tension between industrialisation in 
developing countries and carbon emissions is documented in Azomahou, Laisney and 
Nguyen Van (2006). Using a panel of 100 countries over the period 1960–1996, they 
show that carbon emissions rise as low income countries pursue policies aimed at 
economic development. More recent data from the International Energy Agency 
illustrates the higher growth rate of carbon emissions in less developed regions. 
Between 1990 and 2007, CO2 emissions from fuel combustion increased significantly 
                                                      
10  The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesises that the relationship between per capita 
income and the use of natural resources, the emission of waste or in this case carbon emissions 
may have an inverted U-shape.    15
in developing regions; China (+170.6 percent), Middle East (+136.1 percent), Asia 
(+126.6 percent), Latin America (+68.2 percent) and Africa (+61.5 percent). This 




Turning to the biofuels issue, the growing demand for this energy source has had 
unintended consequences for the world supply and price of food. While estimates as 
to the precise contribution that diversion of agricultural crops into biofuel feedstock 
made to the sharp increase in food prices experienced between 2006 and 2008 differ, 
there is no doubt that they were a contributory factor (Mitchell, 2008). Biofuel 
support policies in developed countries have been heavily criticised for their uncertain 
contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and their excessive cost. However, 
biofuel production in developing countries has a much more positive carbon balance 
and has the potential to contribute to increased income and employment opportunities. 
However, there is the danger that this is at the expense of the food security of net food 
purchasers if food prices are higher as a result. 
 
Trade-offs between achieving the MDGs targets for 2015 and reducing the rate of 
biodiversity  loss are also widely recognized. The scenarios of the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment suggest that future development paths that show relatively 
good progress toward the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of eradicating 
extreme poverty and improving health also show relatively high rates of biodiversity 
                                                      
11 Assessing growth in carbon emissions per unit of GDP or by population represent alternative 
approaches to assessing the evolution of carbon intensity. In both cases, the broad picture remains 
similar. CO2 emissions per person increased by 3.4 percent in OECD countries and 24.9 percent 
in non-OECD countries over the period 1990-2007. With the exception of China where emissions 
per GDP PPP fell by 47.7 percent between 1990-2007, the more developed regions fared better; 
European Union 27 -33.2 percent, USA -27 percent, Asia -10.4 percent, Africa -8.8 percent, Latin 
America -4.7 percent and Middle East +17.9 percent.    16
loss over 50 years.
12  Governments frequently use development policies at the 
extensive margin - through colonization-settlement projects (often poorly conceived 
and poorly funded) into remote frontier areas - as ways to relieve the political 
pressures of the poor in already settled areas.
  That is, frontier expansion in land-rich 
countries plays the role of anti-poverty policy substituting for social programmes 
(Barbier 2006). Whether or not associated with frontier expansion, improving rural 
transportation networks is another common feature of hunger reduction strategies that 
increases the rates of biodiversity loss, both directly through habitat fragmentation 
and indirectly by increasing the profitability of unsustainable harvesting of forest 
resources (Ferreira, 2008). A change to the Common Agricultural Policy or lower 
trade barriers to the import of biofuels that led to agricultural frontier expansion and 
intensification of agricultural production systems in the developing world would have 
an adverse impact on biodiversity through changes in natural habitats. Many other 
development activities aimed at poverty reduction in LDCs would also be likely to 
have negative impacts on biodiversity as the value of biodiversity is typically not 
factored in. 
 
The fact that development objectives can conflict underlines that full policy coherence 
is not attainable. The scenario where an EU trade policy might lead to economic 
growth and higher employment in rural Brazil, while at the same time compromise 
longer-term sustainable development through biodiversity loss, illustrates the 
challenges in identifying coherent policies. In the cases where development objectives 
conflict, skilful navigation the trade-offs to ascertain the most coherent policies will 
require that policymakers have sophisticated understand of the multi-dimensionality 
                                                      
12 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Biodiversity 
Synthesis. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.   17
of the development process and make use of advanced techniques for measuring 
policy impact.  
 
3.3 Developing Country Policies: Preserving Policy Space or Protecting Interest 
Groups? 
We referred above to the evidence that often government policies in developed 
countries are driven more by interest groups than by genuine national welfare 
considerations. But taking account of the political economy of decision-making is also 
relevant in developing countries. Are developing country domestic policies or 
positions in international negotiations really compatible with promoting pro-poor 
growth at home? How should the PCD agenda react to the question whether the 
articulated demands of developing countries are themselves merely expressions of 
elite interest groups within those countries?  
 
While acknowledging the importance of according respect to the official positions of 
developing countries, a number of examples where elite interest groups appear to 
have captured policymaking in developing countries to the detriment of the national 
interest can be identified. The PCD agenda should be cognisant of such underlying 
political economy considerations in the policy formulation process of developing 
countries.  
 
Consider the historical experience of trade reform in developing countries. As argued 
by Rodrik (1998) a broad consensus on what constitutes growth-enhancing trade   18
reform has existed for a number of decades.
13 Nevertheless,  many  developing 
countries have been slow to reform, have implemented reforms poorly or have 
reversed their reforms. Bienen (1991) points to elite capture as the core reason for 
reluctance to pursue trade liberalising reforms.  
 
“Trade liberalization policies are often extremely hard to formulate and 
implement in Africa precisely because it is powerful officials (civilian and 
military) who benefit from the controls that have been established over 
imports and exports. It is government officials who ration and distribute scarce 
imports, including foreign exchange. They realize the rents which accrue from 
the systems they construct and control.” (1991, 76) 
 
Owners of local import substitution industries, often patrons of civilian and military 
officials, also gain significant rents from import quotas, high tariffs and official 
licenses through higher prices and lack of competition, The literature suggests that 
trade protection is “most pervasive in states characterised by vehement demands for 
protection articulated by well organised groups and state institutions that fail to 
insulate policymakers from the brunt of these demands” (Mansfield and Busch, 2009). 
While there may indeed for good economic reasons for maintaining domestic 
protection, it would be naïve to ignore the possibility that developing country policies 
may simply reflect the interests of particular elites. 
 
                                                      
13 As Rodrik (1998) argues: “The consensus can be crudely expressed in terms of a number of dos 
and don’ts: demonopolize trade; streamline the import regime, reduce red tape and implement 
transparent customs procedures; replace quantitative restrictions with tariffs; avoid extreme 
variation in tariff rates and excessively high rates of effective protection; allow exporters duty-free 
access to imported inputs; refrain from large doses of anti-export bias; do not tax export crops too 
highly.”    19
WTO debates over the contentious ‘Singapore issues’ have divided WTO member 
states, largely along North-South lines. The debates centred on whether negotiations 
should be launched to draw up binding new rules governing the areas of investment, 
transparency in government procurement, and competition policy.
14 The  EU  was 
among the leading proponents of additional disciplines in all of these areas, while 
developing country opponents led by India argued that they would hinder domestic 
firms in competing against foreign-owned multinational enterprises and intrude 
unduly on the “policy space” of developing economies. The potential long term 
benefits of adoption of the Singapore issues for developing countries are debated by 
experts, a point we discuss in the following section.
15 Explanations for the reluctance 
of developing countries to embrace a multilateral agreement on the Singapore issues 
are wide and varied.
16 However, it would again be naïve to ignore the possibility that 
the reluctance of developing countries to embrace additional WTO disciplines is 
driven by elites eager to protect their influence over public procurement contracts, the 
profitability of local enterprises supported by uncompetitive regulatory practices and 
protected from local competition from multinationals.  
 
                                                      
14 Discussion on these issues began at the 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore.  Following 
the acrimonious collapse of the Cancún Ministerial
 Conference in 2003, the ‘July 2004 package’ 
that emerged from the General Council session held just under a year later attempted to set the 
Doha Round negotiations back on track by agreeing to begin negotiations on trade facilitation and 
dropping the three more controversial subjects from the WTO current work programme.  
15 Developing countries and many NGOs argued furthermore that the WTO is not the appropriate 
forum in which to address the Singapore issues (Coulby, 2003; Hoekman
 and Vines, 2007), 
though the contrary position is argued by Maskus (2002) and Evenett (2007). 
16 The shortage of institutional capacity in developing countries was a main rationale for their 
resistance to the introduction of these new issues onto the WTO agenda (see e.g. Finger and 
Schuler, 2000). Panagariya (2002) cites a number of other valid reasons why developing countries 
have been resistant to the idea of an agreement including uncertainty over future benefits, the 
greater burden on developing countries to implement a multilateral agreement, exposure to trade 
sanctions for non-compliance in a timely manner and concern about acceding to a multilateral 
agreement on portfolio investment due to the increased risk of sudden capital flight.     20
As a third example, there is an increasing trend among high and middle-income 
developing countries to lease large areas of land in other developing countries for 
commercial agricultural production. Motivated by food security concerns and demand 
for biofuel, state and non-state investors from Bahrain, China, Egypt, India, Japan, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the United 
Arab Emirates have taken long term leases to millions of hectares in African countries 
such as Sudan, Mozambique, Mali, and Ethiopia.
17 For these developing countries 
such leasing can bring much needed revenue streams as well as potentially giving a 
boost to low-productivity agricultural systems. 
 
However, many development NGOs have questioned whether these leasing activities 
are really in the interests of the poor or simply serve to line the pockets of existing 
elites. There is evidence that foreign investors are targeting countries with weak 
institutions in order to cut deals that crowd out local farmers. NGOs warn about the 
displacement of smallholders from traditional lands, the potential damage to 
ecosystems and biodiversity, reduced food production capacity and the likely under-
pricing of the true value of the land. The World Bank has discussed the drawing up 
international rules on agricultural investments that would protect local citizens, 
ecosystems and biodiversity and ensure equitable terms for local populations (World 
Bank, 2010). Such moves recognize the potential for conflicting interests between 
those in power and the population at large in developing countries.  
 
These three examples provide evidence that the developing countries’ agenda can be 
more opaque than is apparent at first glance. Developing country political economy 
                                                      
17 According to the World Bank (2010), the rights to some 50 million hectares in Africa alone 
have either been acquired since 2006 or are under negotiation.    21
considerations must be evaluated when the coherence of policies is considered. For 
the PCD agenda, it raises the question of policy coherence with whom? Advocates of 
the PCD agenda must walk a fine line between respecting the official position and 
autonomy of developing countries, understanding local political economy 
considerations and keeping abreast of the evolving evidence on what policies are most 
likely to lead to sustainable development outcomes.  
 
3.4 Divergent Opinions among Experts 
Identifying coherent policy is helped when consensus prevails among experts on what 
constitutes ‘good’ development policy. When divergent opinions exist, the search for 
coherence is undermined by uncertainty as to what the benchmark for coherence is. 
We explore the issues of divergent opinions among experts by returning to the 
Singapore issues and considering furthermore the issues of debt relief and 
conditionality.  
 
Notwithstanding the political economy of developing countries’ stance on the 
Singapore issues, there exists significant disagreement among experts as to whether 
the proposed new rules are supportive of economic progress. In a well-known book 
entitled Kicking away the Ladder, Chang (2002) argues that the developed world, 
through the World Trade Organisation, seeks to reduce the policy space available to 
the developing world to adopt the kinds of policies that many developed economies 
themselves followed at earlier stages of their development.  
Alternatively, in an early review of the literature
 on the industrial policies of the fast-
growing East-Asian economies, Evenett (2003) found that they rarely resorted to 
cartelisation, forced mergers, or discriminatory enforcement
 of competition law. To   22
the extent that they intervened
 to influence the degree of rivalry among domestic 
firms, the
 evidence pointed instead to measures to promote competition.
18 By way of 
example, there is growing evidence to suggest that liberalisation of 
telecommunication sectors in developing countries that lead to greater usage has 
supported the economic activities of the poor (Jensen 2007, Aker 2008).  
While developed country firms may indeed have most to gain from more liberal 
access to procurement, the potential that such services might well be offshored to 
developing economies must also be borne in mind. As to the advantages of regulating 
foreign direct investment, it is well known that the desire to address market failures 
must be set against the potential for government failures, particularly in countries 
characterised by poor institutional capacity, in deciding whether intervention is 
justified.
19  
Further divergent opinions exist in the area of debt relief. In recent years, a number of 
multilateral debt reduction programmes, such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) designed to tackle 
issues of odious and unsustainable debt in developing countries, have been supported 
by many development experts and practitioners. The programmes are motivated by 
development concerns and seek to reduce the drain on developing country fiscal 
                                                      
18  Evenett (2007) also points out that proponents of a multilateral
 framework on competition 
policy acknowledge that exceptions should be granted in the event of a substantial
 clash between 
the proposed obligations and national development
 policy so that, even if there is an encroachment 
on useful policy
 space, solutions are envisaged that did no undermine development prospects.  
Woolcock (2003) argues furthermore that the commitments involved in greater transparency in 
government procurement are modest and will not encroach on national policy autonomy. 
19 In similar fashion, Evenett (2007) states bluntly that “when one considers
 how rarely, if ever, 
one hears of development success stories
  based on degrading a nation's trade facilitation 
infrastructure,
 on greater delays and costs at ports and airports, and on non-transparent
 public-
procurement policies, one wonders just how ridiculous
 is the claim that the need to preserve the 
policy space of developing
 countries provides compelling grounds to reject the Singapore
 issues”.   23
resources and facilitate greater investment in local investment priorities.
20 Opponents 
of debt relief point to the prevalence of moral hazard in debt relief programmes, 
arguing that all developing countries are encouraged to contract further debts when 
debt relief programmes reward countries that fall into unsustainable debt. An 
additional concern is expressed in a recent World Bank paper which argued that 
repudiating sovereign debts can “create the real risk of reduced flows of lending to 
sovereign borrowers, particularly poorer countries, thereby affecting financial flows 
to developing countries as a result of the danger of ex post challenges to lenders’ 
claims” (Nehru and Thomas, 2008). In short, the debt controversy is a struggle to find 
the ideal legal doctrine and relief process that avoids adverse outcomes, such as 
unsustainable debt paths and the inheritance by innocent citizens of the debts of 
corrupt dictators, without undermining the basis for all lending to developing 
countries or encouraging further unsustainable borrowing. Consensus on what the 
ideal legal framework for dealing with unsustainable debt paths and odious debt has 
not yet emerged, despite the recent multilateral debt relief programmes.  
A somewhat related controversy illustrating alternative perspectives among experts is 
the important area of policy conditionality attached to either aid programmes or debt 
relief programmes. The primary reasoning behind the imposition of “policy 
conditionality”, such as satisfactory implementation of a “poverty reduction strategy 
paper” or maintenance of macroeconomic stability under an IMF approved 
arrangement to secure the HIPC and MDRI debt relief packages is that donors want 
assurance that the relief will not simply be dissipated in corrupt or unproductive 
spending, or in an outflow attributable to unsustainable macro policies. Similar 
                                                      
20 Opponents argue that the benefits of debt relief are subject to elite capture, an argument that 
provides a rationale for conditional debt relief.     24
reasoning has underlain the relatively elaborate policy conditionality accompanying 
structural adjustment and the more recent “policy development” loans of the World 
Bank.   
Other expert opinion rejects this view. Some objections relate to specifics of the 
imposed conditions, ranging from specific points on which there is professional 
disagreement (for example, the design of monetary policy in a country experiencing a 
surge in aid inflows, or the cost-benefit analysis of introducing a deposit insurance 
scheme in a low-income country, to take just two cases in the field of financial sector 
policy) to broad disagreements on general approaches to economic policy, such as 
liberalization and privatization.
21   
 
Further contested issues with conditionality more generally include (i) the question of 
whether a universally effective economic and social policy blueprint for development 
is sufficiently well established to justify its imposition as a condition for the transfer 
of concessionary resources; (ii) the issue of ownership: if a detailed set of 
conditionalities is proposed to an unconvinced government as the price of financial 
assistance, how well will it be implemented?  (iii) the issue of  implementation 
capacity: even negotiating the exhaustive sets of conditions that have been included in 
numerous loans, let alone implementing them, has imposed a heavy administrative 
burden on low-income aid recipients; and (iv) the desirability of allowing a 
democratically-elected government the policy space to design and implement 
measures adapted to local economic and political conditions.  Reflecting these kinds 
of considerations, some have advocated a move away from policy conditionality and 
                                                      
21 For example, the Norwegian government’s Soria Moria Declaration in February 2007 asserted 
that no requirements must be made for privatization as a condition for the cancellation of debt.    25
in favour of broad budget support for governments which the donors see as exhibiting 
a minimally-detailed set of qualifications.   
 
The existent of significant divergence in expert opinion in many of the policy areas 
considered under the PCD agenda renders the search for coherence more challenging. 
While some issues remain controversial, in many cases as the years pass investments 
in research help develop a consensus view on what is optimal development policy. To 
illustrate this point, we need only reflect on the significant changes in development 
policy that have occurred every decade since the 1960s. With this in mind efforts to 
pursue coherence require that PCD advocates are familiar with the best policy 
research and actively invest in its development and synthesis.  
 
3.5 Heterogeneity Between and Within Developing Countries 
Widening differences between developing countries and internal disparities within 
them pose significant challenges to the formulation of coherent policy. The World 
Bank distinguishes between low, middle and high-income countries, with the first two 
groups conventionally defined as developing economies.
22  The Irish Aid programme 
focuses especially on low-income developing countries. These countries face 
particular difficulties in integrating into the global economy and are less likely to pose 
a competitive threat to Irish or European interests. In contrast, the middle-income 
category includes emerging economies such as Brazil and Thailand which already are 
in a position to compete effectively on world markets for agricultural and 
manufacturing products and services. Nevertheless, living standards even in middle-
income developing countries remain well below what would be considered acceptable 
                                                      
22 Economies are divided according to 2007 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank 
Atlas method. The groups are: low per-capita income, $935 or less; lower middle income, $936 - 
$3,705; upper middle income, $3,706 - $11,455; and high income, $11,456 or more.   26
in developed economies, and substantial proportions of the population in emerging 
economies live well below the poverty line.
23  
 
Such heterogeneity between and within developing countries suggest that developed 
country policy reforms will create both winners and losers in developing countries. 
This heterogeneity of developing country interests can be illustrated in the case of 
agricultural policy. The differences in EU treatment of imports from different 
developing countries means that further CAP reform will generate both winners and 
losers in the developing world.  The EU has for some time granted preferential access 
to agri-food exports from many low-income and least developed countries under a 
variety of preferential schemes, including the Generalised System of Preferences, the 
Everything But Arms initiative, and the Cotonou Agreement with 77 ACP (African, 
Caribbean and Pacific) countries. Of particular importance were the sugar and banana 
protocols which ensured that ACP exporters of these products gained significant 
preferential rents on the limited volumes of these exports they could sell on the EU 
market.  
 
CAP reform which reduces European agricultural surpluses and raises world food 
prices will have a number of conflicting effects on the developing world. It will 
benefit the middle-income emerging market economies which are already in a 
position to compete effectively on world agricultural markets. It will lead to 
preference erosion for the world’s poorest countries.  Even for those that are net food 
exporters, supply constraints due to poor infrastructure and institutions will inhibit 
                                                      
23 Given the often sizeable and rapidly-growing middle class as well as often extreme inequality in 
income and wealth distributions in many emerging economies, it can be argued that it is the 
responsibility to tackle domestic poverty is as much a domestic policy issue as it is the 
responsibility of developed country aid donors.   27
their ability to exploit potential opportunities. For the urban and landless poor and 
smallholder farmers who remain net food purchasers, increases in global food prices 
will have detrimental effects, at least in the short run. Over the longer term the impact 
on the poor will depend on the extent of “trickle down” of any resulting development.  
 
In the event of asymmetric effects of trade reform, complementary policies designed 
to compensate losers can be pursued in parallel. In our example of preference erosion, 
aid policies to support the productivity and income of small farmers, provide social 
safety nets, develop alternative livelihoods or promote ‘aid for trade’ policies can help 
to offset the adverse effects of trade reform.  
 
Recognising this heterogeneity has at least two implications for PCD policies. First, it 
is much easier to gain public support for policies which are confined to the low-
income developing countries. Partly this is because their requirement for additional 
resources, for example, for climate change adaptation, will be limited and they hardly 
pose a competitive threat to EU producers. Partly it is because it is easier to convince 
EU public opinion of the neediness of these countries and the responsibility of rich 
countries to address their problems. It is a much more difficult task to persuade EU 
citizens that emerging economies are deserving of support through more coherent 
policies, even though in numerical terms the largest numbers of poor people live in 
these countries. No one objects to Namibia being given the right to export beef to the 
EU; it is quite a different matter when the country benefiting is Brazil. While each 
country pursuing a PCD agenda can decide for itself what partner countries it will 
seek to ensure policy coherence for, it is less valid for the EU to focus on a subset of 
developing countries for two reasons; the EU’s PCD mandate is universal in its   28
reference to developing countries and the sheer influence of EU policies globally 
requires a global approach to PCD. As a result, the EU PCD agenda is always likely 
to be challenged to some degree by developing country heterogeneity.  
 
The second lesson is for the need for aid policies to be altered to reflect changes in 
non-aid policies that negatively affect some developing countries. Where there are 
losers among developing countries from EU policy reform, or where reform makes 
poorer people within developing countries worse off, then the EU has the obligation 
under its PCD commitment to step in and mitigate this damage. Usually, this would 
take the form of financial compensation to the affected groups, either in the form of 
support for social safety nets or assistance to help the affected groups to become more 
productive or to diversify into alternative lines of activity. The commodity protocols 
attached to the Cotonou Agreement are a good example. Some farm groups used the 
argument that, because some developing countries would be made worse off by 
reform of the EU sugar regime, the reform should be abandoned. Instead, because the 
reform moved the CAP in a sensible direction, the appropriate response was to 
provide adjustment assistance to those countries most heavily dependent on 
preferences. This is exactly what the EU did in the case of its sugar and banana 
reforms. The lesson is that aid policies need to be made coherent with changes in non-
aid policies, not only to avoid losers among vulnerable groups in developing 
countries, but also to facilitate these groups in taking advantage of new opportunities 
which changes in EU policies may bring.  
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4.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
In this paper we draw attention to some challenges inherent in pursuing a PCD 
agenda. These challenges help to explain the paradox that, despite political 
commitments to PCD at the highest level, development practitioners often despair at 
the extent of incoherence of EU policies with its development objectives. We propose 
approaches that can help to make the PCD agenda more effective. 
 
The core challenge for PCD presents itself when developing and developed country 
interests directly conflict. In response, we have shown that such apparently conflicting 
interests may actually be aligned if a sufficiently long term perspective is taken. In 
this respect, well designed international institutions and agreements can play an 
important role in locking in credible long-term commitments, overcoming the 
prisoner’s dilemma problem and securing the mutual gains from cooperation. 
Domestic policies are often captured by significant interest groups pursuing their own 
agendas. An understanding of the political economy behind domestic decisions can 
also help PCD advocates to build coalitions with other groups in developed countries 
who do not necessarily stand to gain from the policies in place. 
 
Further complexity in the PCD agenda occurs when separate development objectives 
are in conflict. Experts may disagree on what is ‘good’ development policy. In other 
cases, developing countries’ policies and demands may reflect the interests of political 
elites rather than the majority poor. In response, we recommend that PCD advocates 
are familiar with the best policy research, actively invest in its development and make 
use of sophisticated policy assessment tools capable of measuring impacts at the 
sectoral and regional level within developing countries.    30
 
Finally, growing differences between and within developing countries pose a 
challenge for the legitimacy of and public support for the PCD agenda. Public opinion 
may be willing to adjust domestic policies to benefit the very poorest developing 
countries, in part knowing that any ‘costs’ will be minimal. However, it would be 
wrong to confine the PCD agenda just to the least developed or smaller low-income 
countries.  Policy responses to the needs of emerging economies will need to be more 
nuanced. It will require seeking out win-win opportunities supplemented by more 
targeted interventions when required. However, at a minimum, it means that those 
pursuing a PCD agenda need to make explicit who they decide their development 
partners are. 
 
What will ultimately determine the success of PCD is an effective and integrated PCD 
system comprising (i) effective decision making procedures with significant capacity 
for policy impact and coherence analysis, (ii) strong and comprehensive oversight 
mechanisms and (iii) a robust evidence base. In a recent publication, we suggest a 
series of recommendations to advance the PCD agenda specifically in the Irish 
institutional setting (Barry et al., 2009). We summarise here these three strategic 
priorities designed to help overcome the challenges of coherence, and to realise the 
promise of PCD for developing countries.
24  
 
First, an effective official decision-making mechanism is required to consider PCD 
issues. Enshrining a ‘stake’ for international development objectives can be achieved 
                                                      
24 An alternative set of PCD building blocks are presented by the OECD. These include political 
commitment and policy statements, policy co-ordination mechanisms and monitoring, analysis 
and reporting systems. See OECD (2009) for further details.    31
along the spectrum of formality from the UK’s approach of including the MDG’s as 
part of all government departments’ annual objectives to more informal cross-
departmental groups established to consider and pursue coherence. The success of 
such mechanisms will depend on the skills of the staff involved, in particular in the 
areas of policy analysis and international development, and the existence and quality 




Second, strong and comprehensive formal oversight procedures are necessary to 
ensure that internal government PCD deliberations are informed and critiqued by 
domestic and developing country parliamentarians, civil society as well as developing 
country governments. In the absence of formal oversight mechanisms, there are 
significant risks of group think and lack of awareness of the views of developing 
countries and experts on specific issues of coherence.  
 
Finally, promoting a robust evidence base for policy coherence and policy impact is a 
necessary ingredient to underpin the PCD agenda. The evolving nature of this agenda 
as well as the challenges identified in this paper require on-going research into policy 
coherence and the impact of both current and potential future policy endeavours of 





                                                      
25 An example of a standard process for the evaluation of the policy impacts is the European 
system of Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs).    32
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